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PUBLIC POLICY IS NEVER A SUBSTITUTE FOR
STATUTORY CLARITY: REJECTING THE
NOTION THAT PRE-PETITION ATTORNEY-FEE
DEBTS ARE NONDISCHARGEABLE IN
CHAPTER 7 BANKRUPTCIES
Joshua D. Morse*
I. INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy filings in the United States reached record
numbers in 1998 and still show no sign of substantially de-
creasing.1 For the twelve-month period ending June 30, 1999,
federal bankruptcy filings topped 1.39 million, the second
highest number of filings ever for a one-year period.! Nation-
ally, a trend of increasing bankruptcy filings, especially con-
sumer Chapter 7 filings, persists.3 Such bankruptcy filings
have risen steadily since 1994, when there were approxi-
mately 845,000 filings for the one-year period ending June 30,
1994.4
The dramatic increase in consumer bankruptcy filings
continues to fuel congressional debate regarding attempts to
limit access to Chapter 7 bankruptcy through means testing.5
* Comments Editor, Santa Clara Law Review, Volume 40. J.D. candidate,
Santa Clara University School of Law; B.B.A., New Mexico State University.
1. See American Bankruptcy Institute, Filing Statistics (visited Sept. 26,
1999) <http://www.abiworld.org/stats/newstatsfront.html>.
2. See id.
3. Over one million individuals filed for Chapter 7 protection in 1998. See
id.
4. See id.
5. See Judge Eugene R. Wedoff, An Updated Analysis of the Consumer
Bankruptcy Provisions of H.R. 833 Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, As passed by
the House of Representatives (posted Aug. 27, 1999) <http://www.abiworld.org/
legis/bills/106anal/wedoff833ana820.html>. H.R. 833 would provide for dis-
missal of a debtor's Chapter 7 case (or conversion to Chapter 13) upon a finding
that the debtor had more than a defined median monthly income available to
pay general unsecured debt. See id.
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A recent decision from the Bankruptcy Court for the District
of Colorado,6 considered in light of the increase in Chapter 7
debtors seeking legal representation, makes it essential that
Congress address the issue of attorney-fee debt discharge-
ability.
Depending on the profession, the increase in bankruptcy
filings nationwide means very different things. Economists
may interpret increased filings as an indication of a potential
downturn in national economic stability. Social psychologists
might interpret an increase in levels of debt as a percentage
of disposable income as a change in spending patterns. How-
ever, attorneys practicing bankruptcy law interpret the fig-
ures in an entirely different manner. To bankruptcy attor-
neys, greater bankruptcy filings generally translate into
increased business and a greater number of billable hours,
hopefully resulting in an increased bottom line. Neverthe-
less, in light of the bankruptcy court's opinion in In re Perry,7
it is unclear whether attorneys representing Chapter 7 debt-
ors may receive any form of payment post-petition.8
This comment analyzes the ability of bankruptcy attor-
neys who represent Chapter 7 debtors to collect fees post-
petition. The analysis focuses on how the Perry court disre-
garded the plain language of the Bankruptcy Code9 (the
"Code") and relevant case law, adjudicating solely on public
policy grounds. °
Part II examines the operation and purposes of Chapter 7
of the Code," recent findings from a study on reaffirmation
6. In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998). The Perry court held
that "fees for legal services, properly disclosed pursuant to Section 329(a) and
Bankruptcy Rule 2116(b), regardless of whether the services are performed pre-
petition or post-petition, is not subject to discharge under Section 727(b) if un-
paid upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition." Id. at 501.
7. Id.
8. The term pre-petition refers to any point in time prior to the commence-
ment of a bankruptcy case; the term post-petition refers to any point in time
subsequent to the commencement of a bankruptcy case. Bankruptcy cases
commence with the filing of a bankruptcy petition "under section 301, 302, 303,
or 304 of this title, as the case may be, commencing a case under this title." 11
U.S.C. § 101(42) (1994).
9. All code and section references refer to 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994)
unless otherwise specified. All rule references refer to FED. R. BANKR. P. 1001-
9036 unless otherwise specified.
10. See discussion infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part II.A.
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agreements,'12 case law reviewing dischargeability of attorney-
fee credit, 3 and the use of reaffirmation agreements to avoid
dischargeability. 4 Part III identifies the potential problems
with not allowing dischargeable post-petition attorney-fee
debts in Chapter 7 bankruptcies. 8 Part IV analyzes the un-
predictability that exists in light of the Perry
6 decision. 17
Specifically, Part IV discusses how the Perry court focused on
public policy concerns, lost sight of its duty to interpret the
law, and in effect, invented law at odds with the Code. 8 Fi-
nally, the analysis in Part IV identifies a dangerous conflict of
interest created by the Perry decision. 9 Part V calls on Con-
gress to clear up the confusion regarding dischargeability of
attorney-fee debts.20 Decisive action by Congress will dimin-
ish confusion on this issue and provide Chapter 7 debtors ac-
cess to legal representation.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Chapter 7 Liquidation
As more consumers become entrenched in financial trou-
bles, the United States bankruptcy system attempts to pro-
vide relief to debtors unable to meet their financial burdens.
The act of filing a bankruptcy petition gives a consumer
debtor some breathing room to assess his current financial
situation. Consumer debtors who do not possess the re-
sources to reorganize their debts under Chapter 13 may seek
a discharge of those debts through Chapter 7.21
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.C.
14. See infra Part II.D.
15. See infra Part III.
16. In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
17. See infra Part IV.
18. See infra Part IV.B.
19. See infra Part IV.B.
20. See infra Part V.
21. Chapter 13 allows a debtor to propose to keep all assets, see 11 U.S.C.
§ 1306(b) (1994), in exchange for promising to pay off debts over a period of time
out of future income, see id. § 1322. Chapter 7 liquidation seeks to relieve a
debtor of allowable debts while providing a fair distribution of the debtor's as-
sets to all creditors. See id. § 727. A discharge under Chapter 7 is granted
through § 727 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides:
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge ....
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In a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, only an individual who "re-
side[s] or has a domicile, a place of business, or property in
the United States, or a municipality"22 is considered a "debtor"
for purposes of a bankruptcy. Once eligibility is determined,23
the Chapter 7 debtor files a petition with the Bankruptcy
Court, providing notice to creditors of the commencement of a
bankruptcy. This notice of filing informs creditors that the
debtor has filed bankruptcy and operates to halt any further
collection attempts by creditors. 4 Section 362 of the Code,
which immediately applies upon filing, "stays" the efforts of
creditors to collect on outstanding debts.25 The debtor is then
(b) Except as provided in section 523 of this title, a discharge under
subsection (a) of this section discharges the debtor from all debts that
arose before the date of the order for relief under this chapter, and any
liability on a claim that is determined under section 502 of this title as
if such claim had arisen before the commencement of the case, whether
or not a proof of claim based on any such debt or liability is filed under
section 501 of this title, and whether or not a claim based on any such
debt or liability is allowed under section 502 of this title.
Id.
22. Id. § 109(a).
23. Section 109(b) specifies eligibility for a debtor to qualify for liquidation
under Chapter 7. It provides:
A person may be a debtor under chapter 7 of this title only if such per-
son is not-
(1) a railroad;
(2) a domestic insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative
bank, savings and loan association, building and loan association,
homestead association, a small business investment company li-
censed by the Small Business Administration under subsection (c)
or (d) of section 301 of the Small Business Investment Act of 1958,
credit union, or industrial bank or similar institution which is an
insured bank as defined in section 3(h) of the Federal Deposit In-
surance Act; or
(3) a foreign insurance company, bank, savings bank, cooperative
bank, savings and loan association, building and loan association,
homestead association, or credit union, engaged in such business
in the United States.
Id. § 109(b).
24. See id. § 362(a).
25. Section 362(a) also stays the following actions against a debtor:
(1) the commencement or continuation, including the issuance or
employment of process, of a judicial, administrative, or other action
or proceeding against the debtor that was or could have been com-
menced before the commencement of the case under this title, or to
recover a claim against the debtor that arose before the com-
mencement of the case under this title;
(2) the enforcement, against the debtor or against property of the
estate, of a judgment obtained before the commencement of the
case under this title:
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given a reasonable time to file the balance of the required
schedules. Creditors then have approximately sixty days to
decide whether to contest dischargeability before the court
orders a discharge."
1. Discharge Under § 727
Relief in the form of liquidation under Chapter 7 of the
Code grants a discharge of all non-exempt debts that origi-
nated pre-petition.27 For debtors in dire financial trouble,
possible economic recovery requires the discharge of as many
of the debtor's current liabilities as possible. A decreased
debt-to-earnings ratio post-discharge enables the debtor to
start his financial life over again.
Furthermore, consumer Chapter 7 protection operates
both to give a "fair distribution to creditors of whatever non-
exempt property the debtor has and to give the individual
debtor a fresh start through the discharge in bankruptcy."28 A
discharge eliminates all debts not excepted under § 523(a),29
(3) any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of prop-
erty from the estate or to exercise control over property of the es-
tate;
(4) any act to create, perfect, or enforce any lien against property of
the estate;
(5) any act to create, perfect, or enforce against property of the
debtor any lien to the extent that such lien secures a claim that
arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(6) any act to collect, assess, or recover a claim against the debtor
that arose before the commencement of the case under this title;
(7) the setoff of any debt owing to the debtor that arose before the
commencement of the case under this title against any claim
against the debtor; and
(8) the commencement or continuation of a proceeding before the
United States Tax Court concerning the debtor.
Id. § 362(a).
26. Creditors may object to the discharge of particular debts pursuant to
§ 523, or to the discharge of all debts pursuant to § 727. A § 523 denial of dis-
charge renders only one debt nondischargeable, whereas a § 727 denial of dis-
charge renders all of the debtor's debts nondischargeable. See id. §§ 523, 727.
27. See WALTER RAY PHILLIPS, LIQUIDATION UNDER CHAPTER 7 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE § 22-4, at 129 (2d ed. 1988).
28. See GEORGE M. TREISTER ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW
§ 1.04, at 17 (4th ed. 1996).
29. Exceptions to dischargeable debts in Chapter 7 are listed in § 523 of the
Code, which provides:
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b), or 1328(b) of
this title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(1) for a tax or customs duty... ;
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refi-
580 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
and the debtor receives a new, hopefully debt-free, financial
life.
Section 524(a) ° states the effects of a Chapter 7 dis-
charge under § 727."' Such a discharge:
(1) voids any judgment at any time obtained, to the extent
that such judgment is a determination of the personal li-
nancing of credit, to the extent obtained by [fraudulent means];
(3) neither listed nor scheduled under section 521(1) of this title,
with the name, if known to the debtor, of the creditor to whom such
debt is owed, in time to permit [timely filing of a proof of claim];
(4) for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, em-
bezzlement, or larceny;
(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to,
maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child... ;
(6) for willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity
or to the property of another entity;
(7) to the extent such debt is for a fine, penalty, or forfeiture pay-
able to and for the benefit of a governmental unit, and is not com-
pensation for actual pecuniary loss, other than a tax penalty... ;
(8) for an educational benefit overpayment or loan made, insured
or guaranteed by a governmental unit... ;
(9) for death or personal injury caused by the debtor's operation of
motor vehicle if such operation was unlawful because the debtor
was intoxicated from using alcohol, a drug, or another substance;
(10) that was or could have been listed or scheduled by the debtor
in a prior case concerning the debtor under this title or under the
Bankruptcy Act in which the debtor waived discharge, or was de-
nied a discharge... ;
(11) provided in any final judgment, unreviewable order, or consent
order or decree entered in any court of the United States or of any
state, issued by a Federal depository institutions [sic] regulatory
agency... ;
(12) for malicious or reckless failure to fulfill any commitment by
the debtor to a Federal depository institutions [sic] regulatory
agency to maintain the capital of an insured depository institution
(13) for any payment of an order of restitution issued under title
18, United States Code;
(14) incurred to pay a tax to the United States that would be non-
dischargeable pursuant to paragraph (1);
(15) not of the kind described in paragraph (5) that is incurred by
the debtor in the course of a divorce or separation... ;
(16) for a fee or assessment that becomes due and payable after the
order for relief to a [condominium] membership association... ;
(17) for a fee imposed by a court for the filing of a case, motion,
complaint, or appeal, or for other costs and expenses assessed with
respect to such filing regardless of an assertion of poverty by the
debtor ....
11 U.S.C. § 523(a) (1994).
30. Id. § 524(a).
31. See supra note 21.
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ability of the debtor with respect to any debt discharged
under section 727, 944, 1141, 1228, or 1328 of this title,
whether or not discharge of such debt is waived;
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement
or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or
an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a per-
sonal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of
such debt is waived; and
(3) operates as an injunction against the commencement
or continuation of an action, the employment of process, or
an act, to collect or recover from, or offset against, prop-
erty of the debtor of the kind specified in section 541(a)(2)
of this title that is acquired after the commencement of
the case, on account of any allowable community claim,
except a community claim that is excepted from discharge
under section 523, or,[sic] 1228(a)(1), or 1328(a)(1) of this
title, or that would be so excepted, determined in accor-
dance with the provisions of sections 523(c) and 523(d) of
this title, in a case concerning the debtor's spouse com-
menced on the date of the filing of the petition in the case
concerning the debtor, whether or not discharge of the
debt based on such community claim is waived.32
2. Legal Representation of Chapter 7 Debtors
In seeking the protection of Chapter 7, most debtors re-
ceive legal guidance from an attorney.33 Many Chapter 7
cases are not complex,34 and most bankruptcy attorneys usu-
ally charge a flat-rate fee, 5 due in full pre-petition. Since
most Chapter 7 cases are "no asset" cases, the fee charged
(not including the court determined filing fee) covers the costs
associated with preparation of the petition as well as the at-
32. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a).
33. "Debtors were represented by an attorney in 91% of the sample cases,
assisted by petition preparers in 4% of the cases and filed pro se in the remain-
ing 5%." Marianne B. Culhane & Michaela M. White, Reaffirmation and Dis-
charge Problems, in CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION 1999, at 703,
722 n.18 (PLI Corp. L. and Prac. Course Handbook Series No. 1114, 1999).
34. "The great majority of consumer Chapter 7 bankruptcy cases are 'no as-
set' cases, in which the debtor has no non-exempt assets." ELIZABETH WARREN
& JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS: TEXT,
CASES, AND PROBLEMS 233 (3d ed. 1996) (citations omitted).
35. One study reports a median attorney fee of $550, and an average total
attorney fee of $612. See Culhane & White, supra note 33, at 732 tbl. 10.
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torney's hourly rates for court appearances.36
Since a debtor's cash flow is likely constrained when fil-
ing bankruptcy, many debtors struggle to pay their counsel in
full pre-petition. To enable clients to pay the fee up front, at-
torneys advise clients on a number of different options to
raise capital for payment of fees. Some attorneys advise cli-
ents to stop paying one or more creditors (the claims of which
will be discharged in bankruptcy) for a few months in order to
accumulate enough cash to cover the attorney fee." Alterna-
tively, many attorneys suggest borrowing the fee from a rela-
tive or friend.3" Some debtors may also seek reaffirmation39 of
the debt through the supervision of the court. ° Without these
options, the guidance of counsel may not be available for the
protection of liquidation under Chapter 7 for some debtors.
B. Preliminary Results of a Study on Reaffirmation
Agreements
Most existing case law establishes that the fees associ-
ated with legal representation in Chapter 7 cases, incurred
pre-petition, are dischargeable.4' In order to secure payment
36. The study documented by Culhane and White reports that median fees
were lower in non-credit cases ($550) than in credit cases ($600), most likely "to
cover the risk of nonpayment. However, the mean fee in non-credit cases was
$614, higher than the mean fee of $609 in credit cases." Id. at 722.
37. See In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120, 127 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997).
38. See id.
39. A reaffirmation agreement is "an agreement to repay an otherwise dis-
chargeable obligation." TREISTER ET AL., supra note 28, § 7.09, at 383.
40. See, e.g., In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998); In re Pasco,
220 B.R. 119 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998); In re Nidiver, 217 B.R. 581 (Bankr. D. Neb.
1998); In re Perez, 177 B.R. 319 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995).
41. See Perry, 225 B.R. at 498; see also Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States
Trustee (In re Biggar), 110 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 1997) (ruling that obligations of a
Chapter 7 debtor to attorneys for pre-petition legal work, to be paid in install-
ments post-petition, were dischargeable); Pasco, 220 B.R. at 119 (disallowing
reaffirmation agreement of attorney fees because of failure to advise debtor in
plain, conspicuous, and written terms that she was not required to enter into fee
agreement, or that fee was dischargeable); In re Haynes, 216 B.R. 440 (Bankr.
D. Colo. 1997) (following holding in Martin, 197 B.R. at 120, that a "conflict of
interest" existed because of fee agreement apparently executed pre-petition but
calling for post-petition installment payments that was in nature of discharge-
able debt); In re Zapanta, 204 B.R. 762 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1997) (ruling that at-
torney's post-petition presentment of checks did not fall within the stay excep-
tion of § 362(b)(11) for presentment of negotiable instruments); Martin, 197 B.R.
at 120 (ruling that obligation of Chapter 7 debtor for attorney fee agreement, as
pre-petition obligation not specifically excepted from discharge, was in nature of
dischargeable debt and that fee agreement which enabled debtor to pay for at-
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for bankruptcy services rendered, some attorneys become
quite creative in structuring payments to ensure collection.42
Results from the Reaffirmation Project,43 an ongoing
study at Creighton University School of Law, indicate that an
average of 38% percent of qualified cases studied had an un-
paid balance owing to the debtor's counsel post-discharge."
However, this balance was not included on debtor's sched-
ules.45 The study also reports that attorneys for Chapter 7
debtors extended fee credit46 in "319 (or 38%) of the 850 quali-
fied cases with Form 2016(b) on file."
47
Although 38% of cases had unpaid balances, not one case
in the study included the debt to bankruptcy counsel on the
required disclosure documents.48 Out of the 850 qualified
cases, only one case involved a reaffirmation agreement for
fees owed to the debtor's counsel.49 The results of the study,
together with recent case law in which courts take a more ac-
tive role with the issue of attorney-fee debt dischargeability,
suggest an increase in the use of reaffirmation agreements to
torney's services in installments over time gave rise to "conflict of interest" jus-
tifying at least a partial disallowance of attorney's fees); In re Voglio, 191 B.R.
420 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996) (ruling that pre-petition agreement of Chapter 7
debtor to pay attorney fees post-petition gave rise to dischargeable debt); In re
Symes, 174 B.R. 114 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (ruling that pre-petition attorney
retention agreements requiring clients pre-petition to execute postdated checks
to be cashed post-petition, or requiring execution of pre-petition promissory note
to be collected post-petition, constituted dischargeable claims subject to auto-
matic stay).
42. See, e.g., In re San Miguel, 40 B.R. 481 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984). In San
Miguel, a Colorado attorney proposed a Chapter 13 plan that would pay unse-
cured creditors one dollar each over the sixteen-month plan. See id. The court
failed to approve the plan, holding that the plan constituted an "abuse of the
spirit and purpose of Chapter 13" to repay creditors. See id. The court also
found that the true purpose of the plan was to stretch payment of legal fees as-
sociated with representation over the life of the plan. See id. at 485. The court
recognized the difficulty associated with obtaining Chapter 7 representation
without payment in full of attorney fees in advance, but did not believe that
that difficulty warranted the abuse of the congressional intent of Chapter 13.
See id.
43. See Culhane & White, supra note 33.
44. See id. at 722, 732 tbl.10.
45. See id. at 722.
46. The term "fee credit" connotes that an attorney has extended credit to
the debtor in the amount of the unpaid fees associated with Chapter 7 represen-
tation. See id.
47. Id.
48. See id.
49. See Culhane & White, supra note 33, at 722.
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secure post-petition payment of debts."
C. Dischargeability of Attorney Fee Credit
In Perry, the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colo-
rado held that a properly disclosed reasonable fee for legal
services, unpaid upon filing, was not subject to discharge in
Chapter 7.5" The Perry court, rejecting the Ninth Circuit's
approach,52 followed the reasoning of a consistently criticized
decision from the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Ari-
zona. 3 The Perry decision renews the controversy in the
bankruptcy community regarding the dischargeability of at-
torney-fee debt remaining unpaid post-petition in Chapter 7
bankruptcy.
1. Prepetition Attorney's Fees Remaining Unpaid Post-
Petition Are Not Dischargeable: The In re Mills
Decision
In 1994, the issue of dischargeability of a Chapter 7
debtor's continuing obligation to pay attorney fees post-
petition came to the attention of the Bankruptcy Court for the
District of Arizona.54 In In re Mills, the U.S. Trustee sought a
determination that a Chapter 7 debtor's obligation to pay for
pre-petition legal work through a post-petition installment
payment was dischargeable. 5
Mills is an example of an uncomplicated, "no asset"
Chapter 7 case. The law firm of Hessinger & Associates
("Hessinger") charged Mills, a debtor with few assets, a flat
fee for Chapter 7 representation:56 "$1,500; payable at $125
50. See In re Pasco, 220 B.R. 119, 122 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998) (citing In re
Nidiver, 217 B.R. 581 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1998); In re Voglio, 191 B.R. 420 (Bankr.
D. Ariz. 1996); Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States Trustee (In re Biggar), 185
B.R. 825 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995), affd, 110 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 1997); In re
Perez, 177 B.R. 319 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995); In re Symes, 174 B.R. 114 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1994)).
51. See In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497, 500-01 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
52. See Biggar, 110 F.3d at 685.
53. See In re Mills, 170 B.R. 404 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994) (ruling that obliga-
tion of Chapter 7 debtor to pay attorney fees incurred in bankruptcy case, pur-
suant to pre-petition agreement with attorney, was not discharged).
54. See id. at 404.
55. Although the case also dealt with the adequacy of fee disclosures, see id.
at 405, this comment focuses solely on the dischargeability issue.
56. See id. at 406.
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per month for twelve months, plus the filing fee of $160.""7
Similar to the cases studied in the Reaffirmation Project,58
"[t]he initial Rule 2016(b) Statement59 made no reference to
the agreement."" Although the court found that the firm
failed to comply with Bankruptcy Rule 2016, requiring disclo-
sure of the fee agreement, it nonetheless held that the post-
petition installments due on the pre-petition fee agreement
were not discharged.6 '
57. Id. at 405.
58. See supra Part II.B.
59. Compensation for services rendered and reimbursement of expenses are
outlined in Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2016, which provides:
(a) Application for Compensation or Reimbursement. An entity seeking
interim or final compensation for services, or reimbursement of neces-
sary expenses, from the estate shall file an application setting forth a
detailed statement of (1) the services rendered, time expended and ex-
penses incurred, and (2) the amounts requested. An application for
compensation shall include a statement as to what payments have
theretofore been made or promised to the applicant for services ren-
dered or to be rendered in any capacity whatsoever in connection with
the case, the source of the compensation so paid or promised, whether
any compensation previously received has been shared and whether an
agreement or understanding exists between the applicant and any
other entity for the sharing of compensation received or to be received
for services rendered in connection with the case, and the particulars of
any sharing of compensation or agreement or understanding therefor,
except that details of any agreement by the applicant for the sharing of
compensation as a member or regular associate of a firm of lawyers or
accountants shall not be required. The requirements of this subdivi-
sion shall apply to an application for compensation for services ren-
dered by an attorney or accountant even though the application is filed
by a creditor or other entity. Unless the case is a chapter 9 municipal-
ity case, the applicant shall transmit to the United States Trustee a
copy of the application.
(b) Disclosure of Compensation Paid or Promised to Attorney for Debtor.
Every attorney for a debtor, whether or not the attorney applies for
compensation, shall file and transmit to the United States Trustee
within 15 days after the order for relief, or at another time as the court
may direct, the statement required by § 329 of the Code including
whether the attorney has shared or agreed to share the compensation
with any other entity. The statement shall include the particulars of
any such sharing or agreement to share by the attorney, but the details
of any agreement for the sharing of the compensation with a member or
regular associate of the attorney's law firm shall not be required. A
supplemental statement shall be filed and transmitted to the United
States Trustee within 15 days after any payment or agreement not
previously disclosed.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016.
60. See Mills, 170 B.R. at 406.
61. See id. at 407.
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The court recognized that "[alithough the Bankruptcy
Code and Rules attempt to accommodate, through a complex
statutory and regulatory framework, the potentially compet-
ing interests of creditors, the debtor, and the debtor's attor-
ney, they do not deal coherently with the postpetition in-
stallment issue."62  The court recognized that § 329,63 taken
together with Rules 201664 and 20176" (collectively the "Disclo-
sure Provisions"66), seems to allow the type of post-petition in-
stallment agreement examined in Mills.67 On the other hand,
62. Id. at 410.
63. Section 329 controls a debtor's transactions with attorneys. It provides:
(a) Any attorney representing a debtor in a case under this title, or in
connection with such a case, whether or not such attorney applies for
compensation under this title, shall file with the court a statement of
the compensation paid or agreed to be paid, if such payment or agree-
ment was made after one year before the date of the filing of the peti-
tion, for services rendered or to be rendered in contemplation of or in
connection with the case by such attorney, and the source of such com-
pensation.
(b) If such compensation exceeds the reasonable value of any such
services, the court may cancel any such agreement, or order the return
of any such payment, to the extent excessive, to-
(1) the estate, if the property transferred-
(A) would have been property of the estate; or
(B) was to be paid by or on behalf of the debtor under a plan
under chapter 11, 12, or 13 of this title; or
(2) the entity that made such payment.
11 U.S.C. § 329 (1994).
64. See supra note 59.
65. Bankruptcy Procedure Rule 2017 governs the examination of a debtor's
transactions with the debtor's attorney as follows:
(a) Payment or Transfer to Attorney Before Order for Relief. On motion
by any party in interest or on the court's own initiative, the court after
notice and a hearing may determine whether any payment of money or
any transfer of property by the debtor, made directly or indirectly and
in contemplation of the filing of a petition under the Code by or against
the debtor or before entry of the order for relief in an involuntary case,
to an attorney for services rendered or to be rendered is excessive.
(b) Payment of Transfer to Attorney After Order for Relief. On motion
by the debtor, the United States trustee, or on the court's own initia-
tive, the court after notice and a hearing may determine whether any
payment of money or any transfer of property, or any agreement there-
for, by the debtor to an attorney after entry of an order for relief in a
case under the Code is excessive, whether the payment or transfer is
made or is to be made directly or indirectly, if the payment, transfer, or
agreement therefor is for services in any way related to the case.
FED. R. BANKR. P. 2017.
66. See Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States Trustee (In re Biggar), 110
F.3d 685, 686 (9th Cir. 1997).
67. Mills, 170 B.R. at 410.
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the extent of discharge granted in § 727(b)," taken together
with the absence of an exception for the discharge of attorney
fees listed in § 523(a) (the "Discharge Provisions"), 9 seems to
prohibit this post-petition fee agreement. 7' The court con-
cluded that the danger of not allowing fee agreements in
Chapter 7 cases outweighed the possible conflict of interest
associated with not discharging such agreements.7
The court's rationale was twofold. First, the court rea-
soned that discharging fee agreements would exclude many
debtors, especially indigent individuals, from obtaining legal
representation in Chapter 7 cases. 2 The potential exclusion
from representation was inconsistent with the spirit of the
Code, which strives to give all potential debtors equal access
to the bankruptcy system to solve their financial problems.73
Second, the court reasoned that by holding debtor's coun-
sel to strict disclosure via Rule 2016(b) 74 and approval of fees
via § 329,75 the system could regulate the reasonableness of
fees to protect Chapter 7 debtors.6 Unable to reconcile statu-
tory ambiguity, the court declared that "it does not make
sense to apply the meat cleaver of Section 727(b) to such
agreements when the scalpel of Section 329(b) was designed
for that purpose."77
2. Attorney's Fees Unpaid Post-petition Are
Dischargeable: The Mills Backlash
Around the same time as the Mills decision, many other
courts in the western United States adjudicated bankruptcy
proceedings involving Chapter 7 attorney fees remaining un-
paid post-petition.8
68. See supra note 21.
69. See supra note 29.
70. See Mills, 170 B.R. at 410.
71. See id.
72. See id. at 411.
73. See id.
74. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2016(b).
75. 11 U.S.C. § 329 (1994).
76. See Mills, 170 B.R. at 411.
77. Id. at 412.
78. See supra note 41.
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a. Violation of the Automatic Stay From Post-petition
Collection Actions: In re Symes
In In re Symes, 9 the U.S. Trustee, representing an aggre-
gation of debtors in multiple Chapter 7 cases, challenged the
fee collection practices of two bankruptcy law firms." The
firms argued that their post-petition collection actions of pre-
petition retainer agreements did not violate the automatic
stay of § 362(a)81 and that the fee agreements were not dis-
chargeable under § 727(b)."
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Arizona estab-
lished that both a pre-petition agreement to execute post-
dated checks to be cashed post-petition83 and a pre-petition
promissory note collected post-petition84 represented "dis-
chargeable claim[s] subject to the automatic stay."" The
court first reasoned that the attorney-fee debt constituted a
claim under § 101(5)(a),86 since it arose pre-petition." The
court then noted that all claims arising pre-petition are dis-
chargeable under § 727(b),88 unless an exemption exists under
§ 523(a).8" No exemption for attorney fees due post-petition
exists.0 Therefore, the court concluded that with so many ex-
emptions enumerated in § 523(a), "if Congress intended that
prepetition fee arrangements were nondischargeable, it would
have so provided." 1
The court rejected any perceived "irreconcilable conflict
79. In re Symes, 174 B.R. 114 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
80. See id. at 116.
81. See supra note 25.
82. See Symes, 174 B.R. at 116. See generally supra note 21.
83. It appears that Hessinger attempted to institute this post-dated check
fee agreement to circumvent the ongoing litigation occurring in Hessinger & As-
socs. v. United States Trustee (In re Biggar), 185 B.R. 825 (N.D. Cal. 1995),
affd, 110 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 1997). See Symes, 174 B.R. at 116.
84. The attorney's practice was to "require execution of a prepetition prom-
issory note to be collected postpetition" to retain representation in a Chapter 7
case. Symes, 174 B.R. at 116.
85. Id.
86. A claim is defined as a "right to payment, whether or not such right is
reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent, matured, un-
matured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured.... ." 11
U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (1994).
87. See Symes, 174 B.R. at 116.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 727(b).
89. See Symes, 174 B.R. at 118.
90. See id.
91. Id..
588 [Vol. 40
2000] DISCHARGING ATTORNEY-FEE DEBT
among the regulatory provision of 11 U.S.C. § 329, Rules 2016
and 2017, and the broad discharge of section 727(b) and lack
of a specific exception of such fees from discharge in section
523(a)."92  Further, the Symes court discounted the public
policy arguments that led the court in Mills"' to hold similar
claims nondischargeable.94 Specifically, the court rejected the
defendants' claim that dischargeability provides a great
threat to the ability of Chapter 7 debtors to obtain legal rep-
resentation.95 With the ability of attorneys to provide pro
bono services, or alternatively the opportunity for the debtor
to reaffirm the debt under the court's strict supervision, the
court denied that the breakdown of the entire Chapter 7 sys-
tem was eminent.96
b. The Ninth Circuit's Interpretation: In re Biggar
The dischargeability of Hessinger's post-petition fee
agreement with Chapter 7 debtors again came under attack
by the U.S. Trustee in Hessinger & Associates v. United
States Trustee (In re Biggar)." The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the holding of the Bankruptcy
Court that fee arrangements to pay pre-petition obligations
for pre-petition legal work were dischargeable.98
Three debtors retained Hessinger as counsel in separate
Chapter 7 liquidation cases.99 To secure representation, each
debtor entered into "a fee agreement which specified that
payment for prepetition services was to be made in monthly
installments after the petition was filed."'9 ° As in Mills, the
U.S. Trustee asked the court to review the dischargeability of
the fee agreement. 1 Hessinger argued that discharge under
Chapter 7 did not apply to the debtors' obligation to pay for
services rendered post-petition.102 Hessinger conceded that
92. Id. (citing In re Mills, 170 B.R. 404, 410 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994)).
93. Mills, 170 B.R. at 404.
94. See Symes, 174 B.R. at 118.
95. See id. at 117.
96. See id.
97. Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States Trustee (In re Biggar), 110 F.3d
685 (9th Cir. 1997), affg 185 B.R. 825 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1995).
98. See id.
99. See id. at 686.
100. Id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
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the Discharge Provisions' °. contained in the Code seemed to
classify his claims as dischargeable.14 However, Hessinger
argued that in light of the Disclosure Provisions,"' his claims
were nondischargeable and should pass through bank-
ruptcy.10 6 Stressing a conflict between the Discharge Provi-
sions and the Disclosure Provisions, Hessinger contended
that the Code would not address the approval of post-petition
fees if the Code allowed discharge of those same fees post-
petition.' °7
The court disagreed with Hessinger's rationale for two
important reasons.' First, the court found no authority in
the Discharge Provisions of the Code exempting "debts for at-
torneys' fees incurred in preparing bankruptcy petitions.''
Section 727 guides the court as to the appropriateness of dis-
chargeability of pre-petition debts, while § 523 exempts cer-
tain debts from the reach of the § 727 discharge. ° However,
none of the eighteen exemptions enumerated in § 523 specifi-
cally operates to save attorneys' fees from discharge."'
Second, the court failed to recognize a conflict between
the Discharge Provisions and the Disclosure Provisions. His-
torically, courts interpret Rules 2016 and 2017 as governing
the disclosure and timing of payments to the debtor's attor-
ney,"1 while § 329(b) gives the court authority to approve fee
arrangements."' If these rules only applied to Chapter 7
bankruptcies, a conflict would exist. However, the Disclosure
Provisions contained in the Code also apply to Chapter 11
and 13 cases."' The court emphasized the fact that in Chap-
ter 11 and 13 cases, post-petition fee agreements are nor-
mally part of the debtor's plan and the court must approve
and monitor them.'
5
The court confirmed that the provisions could therefore
103. See supra note 29.
104. See Biggar, 110 F.3d at 686.
105. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
106. See Biggar, 110 F.3d at 686.
107. See id. at 687.
108. See id. at 688.
109. Id. at 687.
110. See id.
111. See id.
112. See Biggar, 110 F.3d at 687.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
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coexist and "the plain language of section 523 must be given
effect."1 '6 Since § 523 does not exempt attorneys' fees from
discharge, the court concluded, "the debts at issue in this case
are dischargeable.""' 7 Unlike the Mills court, the Biggar court
did not balance a debtor's interest in ensuring legal represen-
tation in filing under Chapter 7V8 The court found the Code
clear on this issue, declaring that "[i]f an exception is to be
made, therefore, it should be crafted by Congress.""9
c. Conflicts of Interest Diminish the Value of Services
Rendered: In re Martin
In In re Martin,2° the U.S. Trustee objected to the ap-
proval of a fee application because the agreement created a
post-petition conflict of interest between the Chapter 7 debtor
and her counsel. 2' The application stemmed from a fee
agreement, executed pre-petition, requiring post-petition
monthly payments to pay for the cost of legal services pro-
vided in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy.'
The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado
reached two important conclusions. First, the court rejected
Mills, holding that the fee agreement was in the nature of a
dischargeable debt.'23 The court examined the fee agreement
in a manner similar to the analysis used in Biggar.124 Second,
the court focused on the conflict of interest created by the
change in the nature of the relationship between the Chapter
7 debtor and her counsel post-petition. 2' Specifically, after
filing Martin "became a debtor whose legal interest was to ob-
tain the broadest possible discharge of prepetition debts."26
116. Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1018 (1984)
(holding that statutory provisions should be given effect where capable of coex-
istence)).
117. Id. (citing Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562 (1915) (ruling that excep-
tions to discharge should be confined to those enumerated in Code); In re Mar-
tin, 197 B.R. 120, 126-27 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996) (analyzing decisions holding
pre-petition attorney fee agreements dischargeable)).
118. See In re Mills, 170 B.R. 404, 411 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
119. Biggar, 110 F.3d at 687.
120. Martin, 197 B.R. at 123.
121. See id. at 124.
122. See id. at 123-24.
123. See id. at 127.
124. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.
125. See Martin, 197 B.R. at 127.
126. Id. at 128.
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Meanwhile, her attorney "became a creditor whose self-
interest was to except the prepetition attorney fee obligation
from discharge."'27
The conflict of interest impaired the quality of represen-
tation the debtor received in two ways. 2  First, the fee
agreement gave the attorney remedies129 that § 362(a)(6) ex-
cludes other creditors from exercising.' Second, because the
debtor's counsel classified the pre-petition fee agreement as
nondischargeable, he did not advise his client as to the dis-
chargeability of such debt.' The court concluded that
"[u]nder § 329, ethical conflicts can diminish the value of
services to a client, making the fee charged 'excessive." 8 2 In
this case, the entire fee was excessive, and the court deemed
the agreement "null and void." 33
The same bankruptcy court analyzed a similar situation
in In re Haynes.' Although the court recognized that "there
are legitimate and important public policy concerns about ac-
cess to the bankruptcy system for indigent debtors,""' the
court again rejected the policy considerations of Mills,"6 and
affirmed the Martin analysis.
17
The Haynes decision put bankruptcy attorneys practicing
in Colorado on notice that fee agreements executed pre-
petition requiring post-petition payment are unacceptable.
127. Id.
128. See id.
129. The court stated:
If the debtor defaults in payment of the post-petition installments, the
debt can be accelerated, bears interest, accrues a late charge, and if
submitted to collection may result in additional attorney fees. The Fee
Agreement also authorizes [counsel] to withhold post-petition represen-
tation if the pre-petition debt is not paid as required.
Id. at 129.
130. "For any other creditor, exercise of such remedies to collect a prepetition
debt would be stayed as acts to 'recover a claim against the debtor that arose
before the commencement of the case." Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (1994)).
131. See Martin, 197 B.R. at 129.
132. Id. at 127 (citation omitted).
133. Id. at 129-30.
134. In re Haynes, 216 B.R. 440, 410 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997).
135. Id. at 444 (citing In re Mills, 170 B.R. 404 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994)).
136. See discussion supra Part II.C.1.
137. See Haynes, 216 B.R. at 444.
138. The court stated:
Counsel are advised that they must disclose to their clients that any
fees earned pre-petition are dischargeable in bankruptcy. They must
also be aware that if the attorneys seek to recover pre-petition fees from
[Vol. 40592
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The court warned that if attorneys engage in such practices,
"they are actively perpetrating a fraud on the Court, and if
this Court discovers such activity it will take the most ex-
treme action available against such attorneys, including
seeking disbarment."139  Through the Haynes decision, the
court attempted to improve the level of representation re-
ceived by Chapter 7 debtors.140
3. Attempts to Avoid Dischargeability in the Ninth
Circuit: Quantum Meruit
In In re Hines,"' the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit also addressed the issue of post-petition discharge-
ability of a pre-petition fee agreement in a Chapter 7 pro-
ceeding.142 The court recognized that the issue of post-petition
dischargeability rarely reaches the point of adversarial pro-
ceedings.4 3 The relatively low stakes involved in relation to
the cost of litigation preclude most Chapter 7 debtors from
seeking legal recourse. 4 The court nonetheless felt com-
pelled to "deal ... with the consequences of Congress' delin-
quency in failing to set out express ground rules to be fol-
their clients post-petition, there is a conflict of interest between the cli-
ent and the attorney which must be resolved.
Id. (emphasis in original).
139. Id.
140. The court stated:
The effect of this Court's determination to apply the holdings of Martin
to all cases will mean that every debtor will now have to come up with
some amount of money for pre-petition attorney fees. It will mean that
attorneys will not longer file Chapter 13 cases that really should be
Chapter 7 cases just so the debtor can pay all of the attorney's fees over
time. This Court has heard many times from attorneys that the only
reason Chapter 13 was used was because of the debtor's lack of funds to
pay attorney's fees. And, indeed, this Court has often lamented that
there was no reason for a certain debtor to file a Chapter 13 case when
it appeared from the case file that a Chapter 7 would better serve that
debtor. Thus, because clients will now have to pay for all pre-petition
services before their case is filed, the attorneys will be able to properly
advise their clients without being hampered by the conflict of interest
problem that was recognized in Martin. And debtors will be better able
to make a rational decision as to which Chapter best serves their
needs.
Id. at 444-45 (emphasis omitted).
141. Gordon v. Hines (In re Hines), 147 F.3d 1185 (9th Cir. 1998).
142. See id.
143. See id.
144. See id. at 1186.
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lowed by lawyersY.1 45  Distinguishing the issue at bar from
that in Biggar,' the court held that the debtor's former coun-
sel had an undischarged claim, in quantum meruit, 47 for rea-
sonable compensation for legal services provided post-
petition.'48
The Hines case arose from the competitive circumstances
surrounding the personal bankruptcy business in the greater
Los Angeles area. 9 The debtor originally filed for Chapter 13
protection with attorney Harold Shilberg." One of Shilberg's
competitors, Robert L. Gordon, persuaded the debtor to leave
Shilberg's firm and convert her case to a Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy."' The debtor entered into a fee agreement retaining
Gordon and executed a promissory note supported by seven
postdated checks totaling the $875 fee."2
The problem began when, after Gordon cashed two post-
dated payment checks, the debtor became dissatisfied with
Gordon's post-petition services and reverted back to Shilberg
for representation."' On behalf of the debtor, Shilberg filed a
motion "for contempt against Gordon for willful violation of
the Section 362(a)(6) automatic stay, seeking compensatory
damages of $250, punitive damages of $50,000 and attorneys'
fees."'54 The bankruptcy court denied the contempt motion."51
The debtor appealed to the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel
("BAP"), which reversed and remanded for a determination of
damages."6  Gordon then appealed the BAP's ruling to the
Ninth Circuit.
57
By framing the issue slightly differently from prior cases
145. Id. at 1187.
146. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.
147. Quantum meruit is "[an equitable doctrine, based on the concept that
no one who benefits by the labor and materials of another should be unjustly
enriched thereby; under those circumstances, the law implies a promise to pay a
reasonable amount for the labor and materials furnished, even absent a specific
contract therefor." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1243 (6th ed. 1990).
148. See Hines, 147 F.3d at 1190.
149. See id. at 1187.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Hines, 147 F.3d at 1188.
155. See id. at 1188.
156. See id. at 1187.
157. See id.
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regarding dischargeability of fee debt,18 the Ninth Circuit did
not overturn its previous rulings that deemed "courts power-
less to create non-statutory exceptions to a bankrupt's dis-
charge." 159 Fearing a massive breakdown of the entire bank-
ruptcy system, the court concluded that "all claims for
lawyers' compensation stemming from such postpetition
services actually provided to the debtor really do not fall
within the automatic stay provisions of Section 362(a)(6) or
the discharge provisions of Section 727." 6°
The court justified this position, which appears at odds
with the Ninth Circuit's previous analysis,"' on two grounds.
First, the court held that Gordon did not have a viable claim
under § 101(4)(A). 6' Second, without a viable claim, the court
reasoned that Gordon's attempt to collect on his "right to
payment" does not violate the automatic stay provisions of
§ 362(a)(6)." 3 Therefore, the court concluded that Gordon had
an undischarged claim for reasonable compensation for serv-
158. The issue in this case was framed as: "whether the postpetition rendi-
tion of legal services bargained for pursuant to a prefiling fee agreement enti-
tles Gordon to recover the fees for those later services, not from the bankruptcy
estate (which in a no-asset case would amount to tapping an empty barrel) but
directly from Hines herself." Id. at 1189.
159. Id. at 1188 n.6.
160. Hines, 147 F.3d at 1191.
161. The concurring opinion by Judge Tashima criticized the majority for:
undertak[ing] the heavy burden of rewriting the Bankruptcy Code to
come up with [the] best solution from its own public policy perspective.
The answer the majority comes up with is that there must be a judi-
cially implied exception to 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(6) and 727 for legal fees
for postpetition services. The majority reaches this conclusion in spite
of this circuit's binding precedent that the only exceptions to § 727's
discharge are listed in 11 U.S.C. § 523, and that courts are powerless to
create new ones.
Id. at 1192 (Tashima, J., concurring) (relying on Hessinger & Assocs. v. United
States Trustee (In re Biggar), 110 F.3d 685, 687-88 (9th Cir. 1997)).
162. "[It strains the notion of a viable [claim] ... to attach that label to a
lawyer's ability-though agreed upon pre-petition-to receive payment of a con-
tracted-for fee only if and when the lawyer performs the postpetition services
that create the entitlement to that fee." Id. at 1191.
163. The right to payment only arises:
if the attorney actually renders the postpetition legal services that
match up to the debtor's prepetition promise to pay, it strains that
statutory language a good deal to characterize the attorney as having
violated the Section 362(a)(6) automatic stay by seeking payment once
the postpetition services have thereafter been performed. And in that
sense Gordon's efforts to collect the fees at issue would not appear to
have violated the Section 362(a)(6) automatic stay.
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ices rendered post-petition.14 The court held that the value of
Gordon's claim should be determined "under a quantum mer-
uit theory of recovery.
1
65
In In re Jastrem,'66 the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
Eastern District of California followed the Hines analysis. A
Chapter 7 debtor entered into a pre-petition fee agreement
with counsel to pay $1000, secured by four post-dated checks
for $250 each, plus a filing fee of $175.67 The debtor paid $87
of the filing fee pre-petition and agreed to pay the remaining
fee in four installments of $22 each. 6 8
The court required the debtor's counsel to disclose all
payments for services rendered in the Chapter 7 proceeding.9
Once the court learned of the composition,7 ° it set a hearing
to determine how to treat the fee agreement.7
The court crafted a decision that further muddied the wa-
ters in the area of Ninth Circuit opinions regarding post-
petition dischargeability of unpaid pre-petition attorneys'
164. See id.
165. Id. The court followed the reasoning used in Carolco Television Inc. v.
NBC (In re De Laurentiis Entertainment Group, Inc.), 963 F.2d 1269, 1272 (9th
Cir. 1992), relating to the issue of quantum meruit.
Quantum meruit (or quasi contract) is an equitable remedy implied by
the law under which a plaintiff who has rendered services benefiting
the defendant may recover the reasonable value of those services when
necessary to prevent unjust enrichment of the defendant ...
[F]urther[,] . . . "[c]ompensation must be 'expected' [by the party ren-
dering services] only in the sense that the services rendered must not
have been intended to be gratuitous." And of course that aptly de-
scribes Gordon's rendition of postpetition services for Hines' benefit.
Id. (final alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting De Laurentiis, 963
F.2d at 1272, 1273).
166. In re Jastrem, 224 B.R. 125 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1998).
167. See id. at 126.
168. See id.
169. See id.
170. The record indicates that this was the attorney's common business prac-
tice. See id. A declaration was filed with the court "indicating that he had re-
ceived and negotiated post-dated checks from debtors in 38 bankruptcy cases
between January 1, 1996 and May 25, 1998." Id. at 126 n.2.
171. The court set a hearing to determine:
(1) whether the respondent had been paid an amount in excess of the
reasonable value of services rendered; (2) whether any fee agreement
should be canceled; (3) whether the respondent had violated the auto-
matic stay by negotiating the post-dated checks postpetition; and (4)
whether any obligation of the debtor to the respondent was discharged
by the debtor's discharge.
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fees. 172 On one hand, the court classified the amount that re-
lates to services rendered pre-petition, yet unpaid upon filing,
as dischargeable and subject to the automatic stay provisions
of § 362(a).' 73  On the other hand, the court declared the
amount related to post-petition services nondischargeable
and, therefore, owed to the attorney on a theory of quantum
meruit.'
74
4. Properly Disclosed Reasonable Attorney Fees, Unpaid
Upon Filing, Are Not Subject to Chapter 7 Discharge:
Mills Revisited
In In re Perry,171 the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Colorado again renewed the ongoing debate regarding dis-
chargeability of attorney fees remaining unpaid post-petition.
Although recent decisions in the Ninth Circuit 176 seem to re-
solve this issue, the question of dischargeability in the Tenth
Circuit remains unsettled.
177
Perry dealt with a reaffirmation agreement between a
Chapter 7 debtor and her counsel. The court denied the ap-
proval of the reaffirmation agreement because the debtor en-
tered into it after receiving her discharge, 178 thereby conflict-
ing with § 524(c).' 79 Nonetheless, the court held the fee
172. Compare Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States Trustee (In re Biggar),
110 F.3d 685 (9th Cir. 1997) with Gordon v. Hines (In re Hines), 147 F.3d 1185
(9th Cir. 1998).
173. See In re Jastrem, 224 B.R. 125, 132 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1998). This con-
clusion is consistent with the determination in Biggar that "debt arising from a
bankruptcy attorney's fee agreement is dischargeable in bankruptcy at least to
the extent that it provides for postpetition payment for prepetition services.
Pending discharge, the automatic stay bars any such action." Id. at 128 (citing
Biggar, 110 F.3d at 685).
174. See Jastrem, 224 B.R. at 132. This conclusion is consistent with the ju-
dicial exceptions crafted in Hines that operate to allow "the postpetition pay-
ment for services rendered postpetition permissible even though the parties
contract for those services prior to the filing of the petition." Id. at 130 (citing
Hines, 147 F.3d at 1191).
175. In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
176. See Hines, 147 F.3d at 1185; Biggar, 110 F.3d at 685; Jastrem, 224 B.R.
at 125.
177. Compare Perry, 225 B.R. at 497, and In re Mills, 170 B.R. 404 (Bankr. D.
Ariz. 1994), with In re Pasco, 220 B.R. 119 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998), In re Haynes,
216 B.R. 440 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997), In re Martin 197 B.R. 120 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1996), and In re Symes, 174 B.R. 114 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994).
178. See Perry, 225 B.R. at 497-98.
179. Section 524(c) of the Bankruptcy Code sets out criteria for approval of
reaffirmation agreements. It provides:
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nondischargeable because it was "properly disclosed pursuant
to [s]ection 329(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 1016(b)." 8'
The court relied on the public policy arguments contained
in Mills. 8' Those considerations feared a denial of access to
the bankruptcy system by indigent debtors if Chapter 7 pro-
(c) An agreement between a holder of a claim and the debtor, the con-
sideration for which, in whole or in part, is based on a debt that is dis-
chargeable in a case under this title is enforceable only to any extent
enforceable under applicable nonbankruptcy law, whether or not dis-
charge of such debt is waived, only if-
(1) such agreement was made before the granting of the discharge
under section 727, 1141, 1228 or 1328 of this title;
(2)(A) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous statement
which advises the debtor that the agreement may be rescinded
at any time prior to discharge or within sixty days after such
agreement is filed with the court, whichever occurs later, by
giving notice of rescission to the holder of such claim; and
(B) such agreement contains a clear and conspicuous state-
ment which advises the debtor that such agreement is not re-
quired under this title, under nonbankruptcy law, or under
any agreement not in accordance with the provisions of this
subsection;
(3) such agreement has been filed with the court and, if applicable,
accompanied by a declaration or an affidavit of the attorney that
represented the debtor during the course of negotiating an agree-
ment under this subsection, which states that-
(A) such agreement represents a fully informed and voluntary
agreement by the debtor;
(B) such agreement does not impose an undue hardship on the
debtor or a dependent of the debtor; and
(C) the attorney fully advised the debtor of the legal effect and
consequences of-
(i) an agreement of the kind specified in this subsection;
and
(ii) any default under such an agreement;
(4) the debtor has not rescinded such agreement at any time prior
to discharge or within sixty days after such agreement is filed with
the court, whichever occurs later, by giving notice of rescission to
the holder of such claim;
(5) the provisions of subsection (d) of this section have been com-
plied with; and
(6)(A) in a case concerning an individual who was not represented
by an attorney during the course of negotiating an agreement
under this subsection, the court approves such agreement as-
(i) not imposing an undue hardship on the debtor or a de-
pendent of the debtor; and
(ii) in the best interest of the debtor.
(B) Subparagraph (A) shall not apply to the extent that such
debt is a consumer debt secured by real property.
11 U.S.C. § 524(c) (1994).
180. Perry, 225 B.R. at 500.
181. Mills, 170 B.R. at 404.
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hibits entering into fee agreements.'82 The court also recog-
nized the conflicts of interest arising in the culmination of re-
affirmation agreements in Chapter 7 cases.'83 Although many
courts across the nation allow reaffirmation agreements184 as
a viable option to full payment pre-petition in Chapter 7
cases, the Perry court asserted, "it is not apparent in the
Bankruptcy Code that Congress contemplated such agree-
ments."''
D. Another Possible Solution to Dischargeability:
Reaffirmation Agreements
One potential solution used to combat the public policy
concerns regarding fair access to the bankruptcy system for
indigent individuals is the reaffirmation of the debt associ-
ated with legal fees.' By reaffirming the debt in a Chapter 7
bankruptcy, the debtor makes a fully informed decision to pay
a debt post-petition knowing the Code does not require pay-
ment in light of discharge.' 7 However, the possibility of coer-
cion or misrepresentation is prevalent in a reaffirmation
agreement situation because counsel for the debtor will ulti-
mately become a creditor post-petition. Therefore, the Code
mandates that the courts strictly supervise reaffirmation
agreements."'
Historically, bankruptcy courts permitted the debtor and
the creditor to enter reaffirmation agreements.' Formal re-
affirmation agreements first appeared in the Bankruptcy Re-
form Act of 1978.18 However, the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 substantially revised the
requirements for approval of reaffirmation agreements. 91Both § 524(c)1 2 and § 524(d) 8 operate as guides for approving
182. See id. at 500.
183. See id. at 497.
184. See discussion infra Part II.D.
185. Perry, 225 B.R. at 500.
186. See In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120, 127 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996).
187. See id.
188. See 11 U.S.C. § 524(c), (d) (1994).
189. See generally ROBERT A. HESSLING, REAFFIRMATION AND REDEMPTION
139-40 (1994).
190. See id. at 140.
191. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 524(c)-(d) (1994); HESSLING, supra note 189, at 141.
192. See supra note 179.
193. Section 524(d) of the Bankruptcy Code further regulates the court's ap-
proval of reaffirmation agreements. It provides:
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reaffirmation agreements.
In In re Pasco,' the Bankruptcy Court for the District of
Colorado concluded that a "debtor may, under proper circum-
stances, reaffirm [a] fee agreement with bankruptcy counsel
and thereby pay prepetition legal fees on [a] postpetition ba-
sis. " "' In Pasco, the debtor and her counsel entered into a re-
affirmation agreement pre-petition for legal services associ-
ated with representation in a Chapter 7 case.9 The debtor's
attorney asked the court to approve a reaffirmation agree-
ment representing fees incurred pre-petition but requiring
payment post-petition."9
The court recognized that case law barred the filing of a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy with an outstanding balance owing
post-petition to debtor's counsel.' s Noting the potential diffi-
culties in raising the necessary funds for all pre-petition
services before filing, the court declared reaffirmation, when
(d) In a case concerning an individual, when the court has determined
whether to grant or not to grant a discharge under section 727, 1141,
1228, or 1328 of this title, the court may hold a hearing at which the
debtor shall appear in person. At any such hearing, the court shall in-
form the debtor that a discharge has been granted or the reason why a
discharge has not been granted. If a discharge has been granted and if
the debtor desires to make an agreement of the kind specified in sub-
section (c) of this section and was not represented by an attorney dur-
ing the course of negotiating such agreement, then the court shall hold
a hearing at which the debtor shall appear in person and at such
hearing the court shall-
(1) inform the debtor-
(A) that such an agreement is not required under this title,
under nonbankruptcy law, or under any agreement not made
in accordance with the provisions of subsection (c) of this sec-
tion; and
(B) of the legal effect and consequences of-
(i) an agreement of the kind specified in subsection (c) of
this section; and
(ii) a default under such an agreement; and
(2) determine whether the agreement that the debtor desires to
make complies with the requirements of subsection (c)(6) of this
section, if the consideration for such agreement is based in whole
or in part on a consumer debt that is not secured by real property
of the debtor.
11 U.S.C. § 524(d) (1994).
194. In re Pasco, 220 B.R. 119 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
195. Id. at 119.
196. See id. at 120-21.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 120.
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properly supervised by the court under § 524(c) 9' and (d),2°° a
viable option for Chapter 7 debtors to retain representation.21
Unfortunately, the reaffirmation agreement in Pasco
failed to state "in plain, conspicuous, and written terms" that:
(1) the debtor did not have to enter into the agreement, and
(2) that the fee agreement was dischargeable. Such omissions
prevented the court from approving the agreement. °2 With
the reaffirmation agreement between the debtor and her
counsel void, the debt became dischargeable.0 '
III. IDENTIFICATION OF THE PROBLEM
The problem with the analysis used in Perry arises when
a balance remains unpaid upon filing a Chapter 7 debtor's pe-
tition. When a debtor files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, the rela-
tionship between debtor and counsel changes if an outstand-
ing balance for attorney fees remains. As counsel for the
debtor, the attorney strives to discharge as much pre-petition
debt as the Code permits. On the other hand, as a creditor,
the attorney may not want to inform the client about the dis-
chargeability of the fees still owing.
The dual purposes of Chapter 7 are to provide a fresh
start to the debtor and treat all creditors equally. °4 With
fewer debts remaining after bankruptcy, the debtor retains a
better chance at regaining financial stability. A nondis-
charged fee that remains collectible post-petition conflicts
with both goals of Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Taking the figures obtained from the Reaffirmation Proj-
ect,' °5 together with the decision in Perry,"6 it is evident that
confusion exists in the bankruptcy legal community regarding
dischargeability of pre-petition attorney-fee debt. Many at-
torneys are unsure of the dischargeability of unpaid post-
petition attorney-fee debts. Further, some attorneys may be
misleading debtors as to the dischargeability of these debts,
assuming most debtors will not pursue legal action against
199. See supra note 179.
200. See supra note 193.
201. See Pasco, 220 B.R. at 119.
202. See id. at 122-23.
203. See id.
204. See TREISTER ET AL., supra note 28.
205. See supra Part II.B.
206. See generally In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
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their own bankruptcy counsel.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Haynes court stated: "If Congress decides to insert a
new sub-section to § 523 to provide for the nondischargeabil-
ity of debtors' prepetition attorneys' fees, it certainly has that
option. But until that time, we must all live with the law as
it stands."" ' Congress has yet to act on this issue, although
some courts create their own interpretations to skirt dis-
chargeability. °' A danger to the legal system exists when any
court substitutes its judgment for the legislative acts of Con-
gress. Congress must act first to ensure the highest level of
professional representation in Chapter 7 cases.
A. No Exception Exists to Exempt Post-petition Attorneys'
Fees Remaining Unpaid From Discharge
The Biggar court's analysis is correct."9 An agreement
between debtor and counsel for Chapter 7 representation,
consummated pre-petition and obligating post-petition re-
payment, is dischargeable along with other debts incurred
pre-petition. It is squarely against the discharge provisions
contained in § 72720 to conclude otherwise.
Even interpreting the requirements of discharge2" in
light of the disclosure requirements2. 2 contained in the Code
does not exempt a fee debt from discharge, because the disclo-
sure requirements contained in the Code also apply to Chap-
ter 11 and 13 proceedings.2"' The court supervision of attor-
neys' fees through the disclosure requirements also applies to
Chapter 7 proceedings where reaffirmation of the fee debt oc-
curs. Thus, where no conflict between the disclosure and dis-
charge provisions exists, "the plain language of § 523 must be
given effect."2"4
207. In re Haynes, 216 B.R. 440, 445 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997).
208. See Perry, 225 B.R. at 497; In re Mills, 170 B.R. 404 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
1994).
209. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.
210. See supra note 21.
211. See supra notes 21, 29.
212. See supra notes 59, 63, 65.
213. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.b.
214. Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States Trustee (In re Biggar), 110 F.3d
685, 688 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986,
1018 (1984) (ruling that statutory provisions should be given effect where capa-
602 [Vol. 40
2000] DISCHARGING ATTORNEY-FEE DEBT
Giving Chapter 7 debtors a fresh start post-petition re-
quires a discharge of all debts other than those expressly
listed in § 523. Congress did not include debts for attorneys'
fees in the exemptions listed in § 523.215 Therefore, because
Congress specifically excluded attorneys' fees from the ex-
emptions, attorneys' fees remain dischargeable. Congress's
intentions are clear from this exclusion: attorney-fee debts
should be discharged post-petition. 16
B. The Defects of Perry
Although the court in Perry is not bound by Ninth Circuit
decisions, it should have followed Biggar and its progeny. Ig-
noring common sense and the guidance of Martin, the Perry
court concentrated on the perceived conflict between the dis-
charge and disclosure provisions in the Code.217 The court
conceded that the majority in Martin correctly analyzed the
discharge provisions of the Code.218 However, the court ques-
tioned why the disclosure provisions contemplate the valida-
tion of fees if the discharge provisions do not allow them to
pass through bankruptcy.219 By ignoring the fact that the dis-
closure provisions also apply to Chapters 11 and 13, the court
erred in concluding that a reasonable fee for legal services is
not subject to discharge post-petition.220
Perry rests, in large part, on the public policy concerns of
the court. According to the court, if attorneys' fees remaining
unpaid post-petition are dischargeable, many debtors would
not be represented in Chapter 7 proceedings. In furtherance
of this public policy concern, the court essentially fabricated a
new exception to § 523.221
ble of coexistence)).
215. See supra note 29.
216. See Biggar, 110 F.3d at 688 (citing Gleason v. Thaw, 236 U.S. 558, 562
(1915) (ruling that exceptions to discharge should be confined to those enumer-
ated in Code); In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120, 126-27 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996) (ana-
lyzing decision holding that pre-petition attorney fee agreements are discharge-
able)).
217. See discussion supra Part II.C.4.
218. See In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
219. See id. at 499.
220. See id. at 500.
221. See id. at 500-01.
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1. No Evidence of any Difficulty in Chapter 7 Access
Exists
The Perry court asserted that if debtors are capable of en-
tering fee agreements to pay for Chapter 7 representation,
then a greater number of individuals will have access to the
bankruptcy system.222 This assertion is unsubstantiated. The
court cited no evidence connecting the decision to discharge
fee agreements with the denial of access to the bankruptcy
system by indigent debtors.223
If the Perry court produced statistics demonstrating a de-
crease in the number of Chapter 7 filings in the Ninth Circuit
since Biggar, then perhaps the public policy concerns would
have validity; however, the number of Chapter 7 filings con-
tinue to increase.224 Therefore, despite the initial finding that
attorney-fee debts are dischargeable,2 5 a substantial number
of debtors still access the bankruptcy system. 6
The "creative solutions" espoused in Martin for paying
attorneys' fees pre-petition also provide opportunities for
Chapter 7 debtors to access the bankruptcy system. Martin
enumerates a number of "creative solutions ... [that] can as-
sist indigent debtors who have difficulty raising funds for le-
gal representation prior to filing a bankruptcy case., 227 Thus,
representation by counsel is available to many debtors
through alternative means, despite the concerns of the Perry
court.
Debtors also have access to many less expensive alterna-
tives to filing a Chapter 7 case with legal representation. For
example, numerous resources available to consumer debtors
222. See id. at 500.
223. See id.
224. See American Bankruptcy Institute, Non-Business Bankruptcy Filings
by Chapter 1990-1998 (3rd Quarter) (visited Jan. 20, 1999) <http:/!
www.abiworld.org/stats/1990nonbuschapter.html>.
225. See discussion supra Part II.C.2.
226. See discussion supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
227. In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120, 127 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996).
Debtors commonly defer payment of other debts or borrow from family
and friends in order to pay attorneys. Attorneys can lessen the finan-
cial burden by quantifying the fee for prepetition and postpetition
services, requiring only payment for prepetition services prior to filing.
If a debt for fees will be dischargeable, some attorneys accept payment
by a third-party guarantor. Some courts authorize reaffirmation of the
debt.
Id. (citing In re Perez, 177 B.R. 319 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1995)).
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enable debtors to represent themselves in pro per. Insights
contained in "do-it-yourself bankruptcy kits," as well as tips
provided by consumer-oriented Internet sites, 228 are available
to virtually everyone.
With minimal effort, many debtors can file in pro per, in-
curring costs substantially less than the cost of assisted rep-
resentation. Even taking into account the time used to pre-
pare the Chapter 7 petition and supporting documents, filing
in pro per is a potential cost-saving option. Further, this op-
tion allows all potential debtors access to the bankruptcy sys-
tem.
2. The Real Conflict of Interest: Nondischargeable
Pre-Petition Attorney-Fee Debt
The Perry court also downplayed the ability of a debtor to
reaffirm attorney-fee debt because of the potential conflict of
interest.229 What greater conflict of interest exists for a
debtor's attorney than to diminish the debtor's fresh start by
collecting fees post-petition?
The reaffirmation process is rich with regulation to en-
sure that a potential conflict of interest does not endanger a
debtor's fresh start. Sections 524(c) 23' and 524(d) 211 operate to
minimize potential dangers from the reaffirmation process by
requiring court supervision. In fact, in proceedings that at-
tempt to reaffirm attorney-fee debts, the court views the
debtor as "unrepresented by counsel. 232
The Perry33 court also believed that the disclosure provi-
sions exist to regulate post-petition fee payments in Chapter
7.234 However, the statutory language of § 524 clearly allows
the court to approve reaffirmation agreements rather than
post-petition fee payments.23' Therefore, the Code does not
provide, as Perry13 incorrectly concludes, for post-petition
228. See, e.g., The American Bankruptcy Institute, Consumer Corner (visited
Oct. 1, 1999) <http://www.abiworld.org/consumer/A.html>.
229. See In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497, 500 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998).
230. See supra note 179.
231. See supra note 193.
232. See discussion supra Part II.D.
233. Perry, 225 B.R. at 497.
234. See generally discussion supra Part II.C.3.
235. See supra notes 179, 193; In re Pasco, 220 B.R. 119 (Bankr. D. Colo.
1998).
236. Perry, 225 B.R. at 499.
605
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
nondischargeable attorney-fee debts.8 7
3. The Court Does Not Have the Power to Legislate
Even the threat of diminished access for debtors to the
bankruptcy system does not justify what amounts to legisla-
tive action taken by the Perry court. The Constitution of the
United States prescribes a "separation of powers" that oper-
ates to distinguish the judiciary and the legislative branches
of our government.23 The first three articles ensure that one
branch of government does not dominate another branch."9
When the judiciary prescribes new law instead of interpreting
the laws enacted by Congress, it defies the separation of pow-
ers of the Constitution.
In this case, it is evident that the Perry court overstepped
its bounds. While the Perry court might not agree "on a
philosophical basis with the results mandated by the Bank-
ruptcy Code . . . [all courts are] bound to apply the law as
Congress has written it."249 Until Congress acts, "we must all
live with the law as it stands."24'
V. PROPOSAL
It is time for Congress to address the issue of discharge-
ability of pre-petition attorney-fee debts. Is there statutory
discord between the Discharge Provisions and the Disclosure
Provisions? Did Congress envision an exception to § 523 that
is absent from the present Code? Congress must speak to
these issues in order to ensure the highest levels of represen-
tation to, and equity among, Chapter 7 debtors nationwide.
If Congress intends to include attorney fees unpaid post-
petition in dischargeable pre-petition debts, then it must now
expand § 523 to include such a provision. Although the Ninth
Circuit properly interprets the relevant statutory authority,242
other jurisdictions are unclear as to congressional intentions
regarding the dischargeability of attorneys' fees in Chapter 7
237. See Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States Trustee (In re Biggar), 110
F.3d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1997).
238. See U.S. CONST. arts. I-III.
239. See id.
240. In re Haynes, 216 B.R. 440, 445 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997).
241. Id.
242. See Hessinger & Assocs. v. United States Trustee (In re Biggar), 110
F.3d 685, 687 (9th Cir. 1997).
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bankruptcies.243 Alternatively, if Congress intended these
fees to be nondischargeable, as the Ninth Circuit ruled, then
Congress should provide further clarification to the disclosure
provisions. In support of the Ninth Circuit's rulings, Con-
gress could simply revise the Disclosure Provisions, alleviat-
ing any perceived tension with the Discharge Provisions.
Upcoming Code reform, which fell victim to the end-of-
the-year problems in the 105th Congress, is currently before
the 106th Congress. Both recommendations regarding pro-
posed changes to the Code were silent on the dischargeability
issue. In light of the present confusion interpreting relevant
statutory provisions along with the willingness of some courts
to act on their own, Congress must clear up these issues now.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Code is clear: Chapter 7 debtors must pay for legal
representation in full before filing or else the debt is dis-
charged. If an attorney-fee debt remains unpaid or not ap-
propriately reaffirmed under § 524, it succumbs to discharge-
ability. Nothing in the Code operates to protect attorney-fee
debts from discharge. Until Congress acts to except these
types of debts from discharge, it is inappropriate for any court
to expand the plain language of § 523.
243. Compare In re Perry, 225 B.R. 497 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1998), and In re
Mills, 170 B.R. 404 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994), with In re Pasco, 220 B.R. 119
(Bankr. D. Colo. 1998), In re Haynes, 220 B.R. 440 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1997), and
In re Martin, 197 B.R. 120 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1996).

